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ABSTRACT
Mean field theory provides an effective way of scaling multiagent
reinforcement learning algorithms to environments with many
agents that can be abstracted by a virtual mean agent. In this pa-
per, we extend mean field multiagent algorithms to multiple types.
The types enable the relaxation of a core assumption in mean field
games, which is that all agents in the environment are playing
almost similar strategies and have the same goal. We conduct ex-
periments on three different testbeds for the field of many agent
reinforcement learning, based on the standard MAgents framework.
We consider two different kinds of mean field games: a) Games
where agents belong to predefined types that are known a priori
and b) Games where the type of each agent is unknown and there-
fore must be learned based on observations. We introduce new
algorithms for each type of game and demonstrate their superior
performance over state of the art algorithms that assume that all
agents belong to the same type and other baseline algorithms in
the MAgent framework.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Multiagent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) is a quickly growing
field with lots of recent research pushing its boundaries [6, 14]. Yet,
scaling the multiagent algorithms to environments with a large
number of learning agents continues to be a problem [5]. Research
advances in the field of MARL [2, 4] deal with only a limited number
of agents and the proposed methods cannot be easily generalized to
more complex scenarios with many agents. Some recent research
has used the concept of mean field theory for enabling the use of
MARL approaches to environments with many agents [12, 17]. Yet,
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the current algorithms implemented for many agents require some
strong assumptions about the game environment to perform ade-
quately. The important mean field approximation reduces a many
agent problem into a simplified two agent problem where all the
other competing agents are approximated as a single mean field.
This mean field approximation, however, would be valid only for
scenarios where all the agents in the environment can be consid-
ered similar to each other in objectives and abilities. Real world
applications often have a set of agents that are diverse and therefore
it is virtually impossible to aggregate them into a single mean field.
In this paper, we introduce a concept of multiple types to model
agent diversity in the mean field approximation for many agent
reinforcement learning. The types are groupings applied to other
agents in the environment in such a way that all members of a par-
ticular type play approximately similar strategies and have similar
overall goals. Now, the modelling agent can consider each type to
be a distinct agent, which has to be modelled separately. Within
each type, the mean field approximation should still be reasonable
as the agents within one particular type are more related to each
other than other agents from different types. Thus, the many agent
interaction is effectively reduced to N agent interactions where N
is the number of types. Note that this is more complex than the
simple two agent interaction considered by previous research and
this can approximate a real world dynamic environment in a much
better way. Most real world applications for many agent reinforce-
ment learning can be broadly classified into two categories. The
first category involves applications where we have predefined types
and the type of each agent is known a priori. Some common appli-
cations include games with multiple teams (like quiz competitions),
multiple party elections with coalitions, airline price analysis with
multiple airlines forming an alliance beforehand, etc. We call these
applications predefined known type scenarios. The other category
are applications that involve a large number of agents that may
have different policies due to differences in their rewards, actions
or observations. Common examples are demand and supply sce-
narios, stock trading scenarios, etc., where one type of agent may
be risk averse while another type may be risk seeking. We call
these applications pre-defined unknown type scenarios, since there
are no true underlying types like the previous case and a suitable
type therefore must be assigned through observations. Another
important aspect in this paper will be the notion of neighbourhood
since each individual agent may be impacted more by agents whose
states are “closer” (according to some distance measure) to the state
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of an agent. For instance, in battle environments, nearby agents
pose a greater threat than far away agents.
Using the open source test environment for many agent games —
MAgents [18] —we consider three testbeds that involvemany strate-
gic agents in the environment. Two of these testbeds correspond to
the known type and the third one corresponds to the unknown type.
We introduce two different algorithms for the known and unknown
type scenarios. We demonstrate the superior performance of these
algorithms in comparison to previous algorithms that assume a
single type of agents in the testbeds.
2 BACKGROUND
Reinforcement Learning: Single agent reinforcement learning
(RL) [15] is the most common form of reinforcement learning in
the literature [1]. Here the problem is modelled in the framework
of a Markov Decision Process (MDP) where the MDP is composed
of ⟨S,A, P ,R⟩, where S denotes the set of states that the agent can
move into, A denotes the set of actions that the agent can take, P
denotes the transition distribution (P(s ′ |s,a)) and R denotes the
reward function (R(s,a)). The agents are allowed to explore the
environment during the process of training and collect experience
tuples ⟨s,a, s ′, r ⟩. An agent learns a policy π : S → A, which is a
mapping from states to actions where the goal is to maximize the
expected cumulative rewards
∑
t γ
tR(st ,at ), where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the
discount factor. An optimal policy obtains the highest cumulative
rewards among all possible policies.
In Multiagent Reinforcement Learning (MARL), there is a notion
of stochastic games [3], where the state and action space are defined
as Cartesian products of individual states and actions of different
agents in the environment. A stochastic game can be considered a
special type of normal form game [9], where a particular iteration
of the game depends on previous game(s) played and the experi-
ences of all the agents in the previous game(s). A stochastic game
can be defined as a tuple ⟨S,N ,A, P ,R⟩ where S is a finite set of
states (assumed to be the same for all agents), N is a finite set of n
agents, A = A1 × ... ×An where Aj denotes the actions of agent j.
P is the transition distribution P(s ′ |s, a) where a = (a1, ...,an ) and
Rj (s, a) = r j is the reward function with r j denoting the reward
received by agent j . Here each agent is trying to learn a policy that
maximizes its return upon consideration of opponent behaviours.
Agents are typically self interested and the combined system moves
towards a Nash equilibrium [11]. Scalability in MARL environments
is often a bottleneck. Important research efforts are aimed at han-
dling only up to a handful of agents and the solutions or algorithms
considered become intractable in many agent scenarios.
Mean Field Games: Mean field theory approximates many
agent interactions in a multiagent environment into two agent
interactions [10] where the second agent corresponds to the mean
effect of all the other agents. This allows domains with many agents
that were previously considered intractable to be revisited and scal-
able approximate solutions to be devised [12, 17]. Amean field game
is defined to be a special kind of stochastic game. In the paper by
Yang et al. [17], theQ function for mean field games is decomposed
additively into local Q functions that capture pairwise interactions:
Q j (s, a) = 1
nj
∑
k ∈η(j)
Q j (s,aj ,ak ). (1)
Here nj is the number of neighbours of agent j and η(j) is the
index set of neighbouring agents. Yang et al. [17] showed that
this decomposition can be well approximated by the mean field
Q-function Q j (s, a) ≈ Q jMF (s,aj ,aj ) under certain conditions. The
mean action aj on the neighbourhood η(j) of agent j is expressed
as aj = 1n j
∑
k ∈η(j) ak where ak is the action of each neighbour
k . In the case of discrete actions, ak is a one-hot vector encoding
and aj is a vector of fractions corresponding to the probability that
each action may be executed by an agent at random.
The mean fieldQ function can be updated in a recurrent manner
as follows:
Q jt+1(s, a j , a j ) = (1 − α )Q jt (s, a j , a j ) + α [r j + γv jt (s ′)] (2)
where r j is the reward obtained. The s, s ′ are the old and new states
respectively. αt is the learning rate. The value function v jt (s ′) for
agent j at time t is given by:
v jt (s ′) =
∑
aj
π jt (a j |s ′, a j )Ea−ji ∼π−ji,t
Q jt (s ′, a j , a j ) (3)
Here, the term aj denotes the mean action of all the other agents
apart from j. The mean action for all the agents is first calculated
using the relation, aj = 1N j
∑
k a
k ,ak ∼ πkt (·|s,ak−), where πkt is
the policy of agent k and ak− represents the previous mean action for
the neighbours of agent k . N j denotes the total number of agents in
the neighboourhood of j . Then, the Boltzmann policy for each agent
j is calculated using β , which is the Boltzmann softmax parameter
π jt (a j |s, a j ) =
exp(−βQ jt (s, a j , a j ))∑
aj′ ∈Aj exp(−βQ
j
t (s, a j′, a j ))
(4)
3 MEAN FIELD MARL AND TYPES
We consider environments where there areM types that the neigh-
bouring agents can be classified into. In this paper, we assume that
the Q function decomposes additively according to a partition of
the agents into X j subsets that each include one agent of each type.
This decomposition can be viewed as a generalization of pairwise
decompositions to multiple types since each term depends on a
representative from each type.
Let the standard Q function be Q j (s,a).
Q j (s,a) = 1
X j
X j∑
i=1
[Q j (s,aj ,aki1 ,aki2 , · · · ,akiM )] (5)
There are a total ofM types and akm denotes the action of agent
k belonging to typem in the neighbourhood of agent j . Notice that
this representation of the Q function includes the interaction with
each one of the types and is not a simple pairwise interaction as
done by [17]. Let us assume that we have a scheme in which we
can classify each agent into one of these subsets. Note that we do
not need each group to contain an equal number of agents as we
can always make a new subset that contains one agent of a type
and other agents to be place holder agents (dead agents) of other
types. We will relax this requirement of decomposition shortly and
in practice we do not need to make these subsets at all.
3.1 Mean Field Approximation
We also assume discrete action spaces and use a one hot represen-
tation of the actions as in [17]. The one hot action of each agent k
belonging to typem in the neighbourhood of agent j is represented
as akmm = a
j
m + δˆ
j,km where ajm is the mean action of all agents in
the neighbourhood of agent j belonging to typem and δˆ j,km is the
deviation between the action of an agent and the mean action of
its type.
Let δ j,ki = [δˆ j,k1 ; δˆ j,k2 ; · · · ; δˆ j,kM ] be a vector obtained by the
concatenation of all such deviations of the agents in the neighbour-
hood of agent j belonging to each of the M types (all agents of a
single subset). Similar to [17], we apply Taylor’s Theorem to expand
the Q function in Equation 5:
Q j (s, a) = 1X j
∑X j
i=1 Q
j (s,aj ,aki1 ,aki2 , . . . ,akiM )
= 1X j
∑X j
i=1[Q j (s,aj ,aj1, . . . ,a
j
M )
+∇a j1, ...,a jMQ
j (s,aj ,aj1, . . . ,a
j
M ) · δ j,ki
+ 12δ
j,ki · ∇2
a˜ j1, ..., a˜
j
M
Q j (s,aj , a˜j1, . . . , a˜
j
M ) · δ j,ki ]
= Q j (s,aj ,aj1, . . . ,a
j
M )
+∇a j1, ...,a jMQ
j (s,aj ,aj1,a
j
2, . . . ,a
j
M ) · [ 1X j
∑X j
i=1 δ
j,ki ]
+ 12X j
∑X j
i=1[δ j,ki · ∇2a˜ j1, ..., a˜ jM
Q j (s,aj , a˜j1, a˜
j
2, . . . , a˜
j
M ) · δ j,ki ]
= Q j (s, a j , a j1, . . . , a jM ) +
1
2X j
X j∑
i=1
[R j
s,aj
(aki )] ≈ Q j (s, a j , a j1, . . . , a jM )
where R js,a j (ak ) ≜ δ j,k · ∇2a˜ j1, ..., a˜ jM
Q j (s,aj , a˜j1, a˜
j
2, . . . , a˜
j
M ) · δ j,k
which is the Taylor polynomial remainder. The summation term
[ 1X j
∑X j
i=1 δ
j,ki ] sums out to 0. Finally, if we ignore the remainder
terms R js,a j , we obtain the following approximation:
Q j (s, a) ≈ Q jMTMF(s,aj ,a
j
1, . . . ,a
j
M ) (6)
The magnitude of this approximation depends on the deviation
δˆ j,km between each action akmm and its mean field approximation
a¯
j
m . More precisely, we can quantify the overall effect of the mean
field approximation by the average deviation
∑
k | |δˆk | |2/N . The-
orems 3.1 and 3.2 show that the average deviation is reduced as
we increase the number of types and Theorem 3.3 provides an ex-
plicit bound on the approximation in Eq. 6 based on the average
deviation.
Theorem 3.1. When there are two types in the environment, but
they have been considered to be the same type, the average deviation
induced by the mean field approximation is bounded as follows:∑
k | |δˆk | |2
N
≤ K1
N
ϵ1 +
K2
N
ϵ2 +
K1
N
α1 +
K2
N
α2 (7)
where N denotes the total number of agents in the environment; K1
andK2 denote the total number of agents of types 1 and 2, respectively;
ϵ1 and ϵ2 are bounds on the average deviation for agents of types 1
and 2 respectively.
1
K1 (
∑
k1 | |ak1 − a1 | |) ≤ ϵ1; 1K2 (
∑
k2 | |ak2 − a2 | |) ≤ ϵ2
Similarly, α1 and α2 denote the errors induced by using a single
type (instead of two types) in the mean field approximation.
α1 = | |a1 − a | |;α2 = | |a2 − a | | (8)
Furthermore, ak1 denotes an action of an agent belonging to type
1 and ak2 denotes an action of an agent belonging to type 2. Here a
denotes the mean field action of all the agents, a1 denotes the mean
action of all agents of type 1 and a2 denotes the mean action of all
agents of type 2.
Proof. Since we have considered every agent to belong to only
one type, the deviation between the agent’s action and the overall
mean action is the error estimate. Hence, we will have the following,∑
k | |δˆk | |2
N =
∑
k | |a j−a j | |2
N∑
k | |δˆk | |2
N =
1
N (
∑
k1 | |ak1 − a | | +
∑
k2 | |ak2 − a | |)
The superscript j has been dropped for simplicity.
=
1
N
(
∑
k1
| |ak1 − a1 + a1 − a | | +
∑
k2
| |ak2 − a2 + a2 − a | |)
≤ 1
N
(
∑
k1
| |ak1 − a1 | | +
∑
k1
| |a1 − a | | +
∑
k2
| |ak2 − a2 | | +
∑
k2
| |a2 − a | |)
=
1
N
(
∑
k1
| |ak1 − a1 | | + K1 | |a1 − a | | +
∑
k2
| |ak2 − a2 | | + K2 | |a2 − a | |)
≤ K1
N
ϵ1 +
K2
N
ϵ2 +
K1
N
α1 +
K2
N
α2
(9)
□
Theorem 3.2. When there are two types in the environment and
they have been considered to be different types, the average deviation
induced by the mean field approximation is bounded as follows:∑
k | |δˆk | |2
N
≤ K1
N
ϵ1 +
K2
N
ϵ2 (10)
The variables have the same meaning as in Theorem 3.1.
Proof. In this scenario we will have,∑
k | |δˆk | |2
N
=
1
N
(
∑
k1
| |ak1 − a1 | |2 +
∑
k2
| |ak2 − a2 | |2)
=
K1
N
∑
k1 | |ak1 − a1 | |2
K1
+
K2
N
∑
k2 | |ak2 − a2 | |2
K2
≤ K1
N
ϵ1 +
K2
N
ϵ2
(11)
□
We presented Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 to demonstrate the reduction
in the bound on the average deviation as we increase the number of
types from 1 to 2. Similar derivations can be performed to demon-
strate that the bounds on the average deviation decrease as we
increase the number of types (regardless of the true number of
types).
Let ϵ be a bound on the average deviation achieved based on a
certain number of types:
∑X
k=1 | |δa | |2
X ≤ ϵ . The following theorem
bounds the error of the approximate mean field Q-function as a
function of ϵ and the smoothness L of the exact Q function.
Theorem 3.3. When the Q-function is additively decomposable
according to Equation 5 and it is L-smooth, then the multi-type mean
field Q function provides a good approximation bounded by
|Q j (s, a) −Q jMTMF(s,aj , a¯
j
1, . . . , a¯
j
M )| ≤
1
2Lϵ (12)
Proof. We rewrite the expression for the Q function as Q(a) ≜
Q j (s,aj ,aj1,a
j
2, · · · ,a
j
M ). Suppose that Q is L-smooth, where its
gradient ∇Q is Lipschitz-continous with constant L such that for
all a,a
| |∇Q(a) − ∇Q(a)| |2 ≤ L| |a − a | |2 (13)
where | |.| |2 indicates the l2-norm. Note that all the eigenvalues
of ∇2Q can be bounded in the symmetric interval [−L,L]. As the
Hessian matrix ∇2Q is real symmetric and hence diagonalizable,
there exists an orthogonal matrix U such that UT [∇2Q]U = Λ ≜
diaд[λ1, · · · , λD ]. It then follows that:
δa · ∇2Q · δa = [Uδa]TΛ[Uδa] = ∑Di=1 λi [Uδa]2i (14)
with
−L| |Uδa | |2 ≤ ∑Di=1 λi [Uδa]2i ≤ L| |Uδa | |2 (15)
Let, δˆma = ajm − ajm , consistent with the previous definition.
Recall that the term δ is then δa = [δˆ1a; δˆ2a; · · · ; δˆMa], where a
is the one-hot encoding for D actions, and a is a D-dimensional
categorical distribution. Then, it can be shown that
| |U (δa)| |2 = | |δa | |2 (16)
Consider the term 12X
∑X
k=1 R
j
s,a j (ak ). Since L is the maximum
eigenvalue, from Equation 14 (with a slight abuse of notation):
R = δa · ∇2Q · δa = [Uδa]TΛ[Uδa] =
∑
i
λi [Uδa]2i ≤ L| |Uδa | |2
(17)
Therefore, from Equation 16:
R ≤ L| |Uδa | |2 = L| |δa | |2 (18)
Thus,
1
2X
∑
k
R ≤ L2
∑
k
| |δa | |2
X
≤ Lϵ2 (19)
□
Thus, in this paper, we modify the mean field Q function to in-
clude a finite number of types that each have a corresponding mean
field. TheQ function then considers a finite number of interactions
across types.
3.2 Mean Field Update
The mean action aji represents the mean action of the neighbours
of agent j belonging to type i . As in the paper by Yang et al. [17],
the mean field Q function can be updated in a recurrent manner.
Q jt+1(s, a j , a j1, . . . , a jM ) = (1 − α )Q jt (s, a j , a j1, . . . , a jM ) + α [r j + γv jt (s ′)]
(20)
where r j is the reward obtained. The s and s ′ are the old and new
states respectively. αt is the learning rate. The value functionv jt (s ′)
for agent j at time t is given by:
v jt (s ′) =
∑
aj
π jt (a j |s ′, a j1, . . . , a jM )Ea−ji ∼π−jt
[Q jt [s ′, a j , a j1, . . . , a jM ]]
(21)
Here, the term aji denotes the mean action of all the other agents
apart from j belonging to type i . In all of our implementations, the
mean action for all the types is first calculated using the relation
a ji =
1
N ji
∑
k
aki , a
k
i ∼ π kt (· |s, ak1−, . . . , akM−) (22)
where πkt is the policy of agent k (in j’s neighbourhood) and a
k
i−
represents the previous mean action for the neighbours of agent k
belonging to type i . N ji is the total number of agents of type i in j’s
neighbourhood. Then, the Boltzmann policy for each agent j is
π jt (a j |s, a j1, . . . , a jM ) =
exp(βQ jt (s, a j , a j1, . . . , a jM ))∑
aj′ ∈Aj exp(βQ
j
t (s, a j′, a j1, . . . , a jM ))
(23)
where β is the Boltzmann softmax parameter.
By iterating through Equations 21, 22 and 23, the mean actions
and respective policies of all agents keep improving. We prove in
Theorem 3.4 that this approach converges to a fixed point within a
small bounded distance of the Nash equilibrium. In Appendix A,
we give a specific example for a case in which the Multi Type Mean
Field algorithm does better than the simple Mean Field method.
We first make three mild assumptions about theMulti TypeMean
Field update and then state two lemmas before giving Theorem 3.4.
Assumption 1: In the Multi Type Mean Field update, each
action-value pair is visited infinitely often, and the reward is bounded
by some constant.
Assumption 2: The agents policies are Greedy in the Limit with
Infinite Exploration (GLIE). In the case of the Boltzmann policy,
the policy becomes greedy w.r.t. the Q-function in the limit as the
temperature decays asymptotically to zero.
Assumption 3: For each stage game [Q1t (s), . . . ,QNt (s)] at time
t and in state s in training, for all t , s, j ∈ 1, . . . ,N the Nash equilib-
rium π∗ = [π 1∗ , . . . ,πN∗ ] is recognized either as a global optimum
or a saddle point as expressed as:
1. Eπ∗ [Q jt (s)] ≥ Eπ [Q jt (s)], ∀π ∈ Ω(ΠkA k ) (24)
2. Eπ∗ [Q jt (s)] ≥ Eπ j Eπ−j∗ [Q
j
t (s)], ∀π j ∈ Ω(A k ) (25)
3. Eπ∗ [Q jt (s)] ≤ Eπ j∗ Eπ−j∗ [Q
j
t (s)], ∀π − j ∈ Ω(Πk , jA
k ) (26)
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 3, the Nash operatorH Nash forms
a contraction mapping under the complete metric space from Q to
Q with the fixed point being the Nash Q value of the entire game.
H NashQ∗ = Q∗
Proof. Refer to Theorem 17 in [7] for a detailed proof. □
We define a new operator H MTMF which is the Multi Type
Mean Field operator. We differentiate this from the Nash operator
defined above. This operator is defined as:
H MTMFQ(s, a) = Es ′∼p [r(s, a) + γvMTMF (s ′)] (27)
TheMulti TypeMean Field value function is defined as vMTMF ≜
[v1(s), · · · ,vN (s)]. This is the value function obtained from Equa-
tion 21. Now using the same principle of Lemma 1 on the multi
type mean field operator, we can show that the Multi Type Mean
Field operator also forms a contraction mapping (additionally refer
to Proposition 1 in [17]).
Lemma 2. The random process ∆t defined in R as
∆t+1(x) = (1 − α)∆t (x) + αFt (x) (28)
converges to a constant S with probability 1 (w.p.t 1) when
1) 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,∑t α = ∞,∑t α2 < ∞ (29)
2) x ∈ X ; |X | < ∞ (30)
whereX is the set of possible states,
3) | | E[Ft (x)|Ft ]| |w ≤ γ | |∆t | |w + K (31)
where γ ∈ [0, 1) and K is finite.
4) var [Ft (x)|Ft ] ≤ K2(1 + | |∆t | |2w ) (32)
with constant K2 > 0 and finite.
HereFt denotes the filtration of an increasing sequence of σ -fields
including the history of processes; αt , ∆t , Ft ∈ Ft and | | · | |w is a
weighted maximum norm. The value of this constant S = ψC1+α |K |α β0
whereψ ∈ (0, 1) and C1 is the value with which the scale invariant
iterative process is bounded. β0 is the scale factor applied to the original
process.
Proof. This lemma follows from Theorem 1 in [8]. We provide
the complete proof of this lemma in the Appendix C, highlighting
the changes from the Theorem 1 in [8].
□
Theorem 3.4. When updating Q jMTMF(s,aj , a¯
j
1, . . . , a¯
j
M ) accord-
ing to Equations 20, 21, 22 and 23, the multi-agent Q-function will
converge to a bounded distance of the Nash Q-function under As-
sumptions 1, 2 and 3:
Q∗(s,a) − Qt (s,a) ≤ D − S
where S = ψC1+αγ |D |α β0 . Here D =
1
2Lϵ , from Theorem 3.3.
Proof. The proof of convergence of this theorem is structurally
similar to that discussed by the authors in [7] and [17]. We provide
the proof here, with changes necessitated by the multiple type case.
Note that in Assumption 3, Equation 24 corresponds to the global
optimum and Equations 25 and 26 correspond to the saddle point.
These assumptions are the same as those considered in [7]. Also
note that the authors in [7] and [17] mention that Assumption 3 is
a strong assumption to impose, which is needed to show the theo-
retical convergence, but this is not required to impose in practice.
The Nash operatorH Nash is defined by
H Nash = Es′∼p [r (s, a) + γvNash (s ′)] (33)
whereQ ≜ [Q1, . . . ,QN ] and r (s,a) ≜ [r1(s,a), . . . , rN (s,a)]
The Nash value function is vNash (s) ≜ [v1π∗ (s), · · · ,vNπ∗ (s)]. Here
the Nash policy is represented as π∗. The Nash value function is
calculated with the assumption that all agents are following π∗
from the initial state s .
We need to apply Lemma 2 to prove Theorem 3.4. By subtracting
Q∗(s,a) on both sides of Equation 20 and in relation to Equation
28:
∆t (x ) = Qt (s, a j , a j1, . . . , a jM ) − Q∗(s, a)
FT (x ) = rt + γ vMTMFt (st+1) − Q∗(st , at )
(34)
where x ≜ (st ,at ) denotes the visited state-action pair at time t .
In Theorem 3.3, we proved a bound for the actualQ function and
the multi type mean fieldQ function. We apply that in Equation 34,
to get the following equation for ∆.
∆t (x ) = Qt (s, a j , a j1, . . . , a jM ) − Q∗(s, a)
∆t (x ) = Qt (s, a j , a j1, . . . , a jM ) + Qt (s, a) − Qt (s, a) − Q∗(s, a)
∆t (x ) ≤ |Qt (s, a j , a j1, . . . , a jM ) − Qt (s, a) | + Qt (s, a) − Q∗(s, a)
∆t (x ) ≤ Qt (s, a) − Q∗(s, a) + D
(35)
where D = 12Lϵ .
The aim is to prove that the four conditions of Lemma 2 hold and
that ∆ in Equation 35 converges to a constant S according to Lemma
2 and thus theMTMFQ function in Equation 35 converges to a point
whose distance to the Nash Equilibrium is bounded. In Equation
28, α(t) refers to the learning rate and hence the first condition of
Lemma 2 is automatically satisfied. The second condition is also
true as we are dealing with finite state and action spaces.
LetFt be the σ -field generated by all random variables in the
history time t - (st ,αt ,at , rt−1, · · · , s1,α1, a1,Q0). Thus, Qt is a
random variable derived from the historical trajectory up to time t .
To prove the third condition of Lemma 2, from Equation 34:
Ft (st , at ) = rt + γ vMTMFt − Q∗(st , at )
= rt + γ vNasht − Q∗(st , at ) + γ [vMTMFt (st+1) − vNasht (st+1)]
= (rt + γ vNasht −Q∗(st , at )) +Ct (st , at ) = F Nasht (st , at ) +Ct (st , at )
(36)
From Lemma 1, FNasht forms a contraction mapping with the
norm | | · | |∞ being the maximum norm on a. Thus from Equation
35,
| | E[F Nasht (st , at ) |Ft ] | |∞ ≤ γ | |Q∗ −Qt | |∞ ≤ γ | |D − ∆t | |∞ (37)
Now, applying Equation 37 in Equation 36.
| | E[Ft (st , at ) |Ft ] | |∞ = | |FNasht (st , at ) |Ft | |∞ + | |Ct (st , at ) |F t | |∞
≤ γ | |D − ∆t | |∞ + | |Ct (st , at ) |F t | |∞
≤ γ | |∆t | |∞ + | |Ct (st , at ) |F t | |∞ + γ | |D | |∞ ≤ γ | |∆t | |∞ + γ |D |
(38)
Since we are taking the max norm, the last two terms in the right
hand side of Equation 38 are both positive and finite. We can prove
that the term | |Ct (sa ,at )| | converges to 0 w.p.1. The proof involves
the use of Assumption 3 (refer to Theorem 1 in [17]). We use this
fact in the last term of Equation 38. Hence, the third condition of
Lemma 2 is proved. The value of constant K = γ |D | = γ | 12Lϵ |.
For the fourth condition we use the fact that the MTMF operator
H MTMF forms a contraction mapping. Hence,H MTMFQ∗ = Q∗
and it follows that:
var[Ft (st , at ) |Ft ] = E[(rt + γ vMTMFt (st+1) −Q∗(st , at ))2]
= E[(rt + γ vMTMFt (st+1) −H MTMF (Q∗))2]
= var[rt + γ vMTMFt (st+1) |Ft ] ≤ K2(1 + | |∆t | |2W )
(39)
In the last step, the left side of the equation contains the reward
and the value function as the variables. The reward is bounded
by Assumption 1 and the value function is also bounded by being
updated recursively by Equation 21 (MTMF is a contraction opera-
tor). So we can choose a positive, finite K2 such that the inequality
holds.
Finally, with all conditions met, it follows from Lemma 2 that
∆t converges to constant S w.p.1. The value of this constant is
S =
ψC1+αγ |D |
α β0
from Lemma 2 and using the value of K derived
above. Therefore, from Equation 35 we get
Q∗(s, a) − Qt (s, a) ≤ D − S ≤
1
2 Lϵ − S (40)
Hence the Q function converges to a point within a bounded
distance from the real Nash equilibrium of the game. The distance
is a function of the error in the type classification and the closeness
of resemblance of each agent to its type. □
4 IMPLEMENTATION
We propose two algorithms based on Q-learning to estimate the
multi-type mean field Q-function for known and unknown types.
The first algorithm, MTMFQ (Multi-Type Mean Field Q-learning),
trains an agent j to minimize the loss function L(ϕ j ) = (y j −
Qϕ j (s,aj ,aj1, . . . ,a
j
M ))2. Here y j = r j + γvMTMFϕ j_ (s
′) is the target
value used to calculate the TD error using the weights ϕ j_. Here the
vMTMF(s) ≜ [v1(s), . . . ,vN (s)]. Now, gradient can be taken as,
∇ϕ j L(ϕ j ) = 2(Qϕ j (s, a j , a j1, . . . , a jM ) − y j ) × ∇ϕ jQϕ j (s, a j , a j1, . . . , a jM )
(41)
Algorithm 1 describes the Multi Type Mean Field Q learning
(MTMFQ) algorithmwhen agent types are known. In this algorithm,
different groups of agents in the environment are considered as
types. An agent models its relation to each type separately and
ultimately chooses the action that provides maximum benefit in the
face of competition against the different types. This is referred to
as version 1 of MTMFQ. This algorithm deals with multiple types
in contrast to MFQ described in the paper by Yang et al. [17]. In
Line 8, each agent is chosen and its neighbours are considered. The
neighbours are classified into different types and in each type a new
mean action is calculated (Line 9). In Lines 14 – 19, the Q networks
are updated as done in common practice [13] for all the agents in
the environment. At Line 12, the current actions are added to a
buffer containing previous mean actions.
Version 2 of MTMFQ (see Algorithm 2) deals with the second
type of scenario, where the type of each agent is unknown. An
additional step doing K-means clustering is introduced to determine
the types. Once we recognize the type of each agent, the algorithm
is very similar to Algorithm 1. The clustering does not necessarily
recognize the types correctly and the overall process is not as
efficient as the known type case. But we will show that this way
of approximate type determination is still better than using only a
single mean field for all the agents. For the implementation we use
neural networks but it can be done without neural networks too.
We only need a way to recursively update Equations 21, 22 and 23.
Note that the total number of types in the environment is un-
known and the agent does not need to guess the correct number of
types. Generally, the more types are used, the closer the approxi-
mate Q-function may be to the exact Nash Q-function as shown by
the bounds in Theorems 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. There is no risk of over-
fitting when using more types. In the limit, when there is one type
per agent, we recover the exact multi-agent Q-function. The only
drawback is an increase in computational complexity. The code
repository will appear at https://github.com/BorealisAI/mtmfrl.
5 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We report results with three games designed within the MAgents
framework: the Multi Team Battle, Battle-Gathering and the Preda-
tor Prey domains. In the first two games, Multi Team Battle and the
Battle-Gathering game, the conditions are such that the different
Algorithm 1Multi Type Mean Field Q Learning for known types
1: Initialize the number of types M and total number of agents N .
2: Initialize the Q functions (parameterised by weights) Qϕ j , Qϕ j_ , for all agents j .
3: Initialize the mean action for each type a j1 , a
j
2 . . . a
j
M for each agent j ∈
1, . . . , N
4: Initialize the total number of steps (T) and total number of episodes (E)
5: while Episode < E do
6: while Step < T do
7: while m = 1 . . .M do
8: For each agent j take action a j from Qϕ j according to Eq. 23 with the
current mean action for each type a j1, . . . , a
j
M and the exploration rate
β .
9: For each agent j, compute the new mean action for each type
a j1, . . . , a
j
M according to Eq. 22.
10: end while
11: Execute the joint action a = [a1, . . . , aN ]. Observe the rewards r =
[r 1, . . . , rN ] and the next state s ′.
12: Store ⟨s, a, r, s ′, a1, . . . , aM ⟩ in replay buffer D , where ai is the mean
action for type i in the neighbourhood. The a captures all the N agents.
13: end while
14: while j = 1 to N do
15: Sample a minibatch of K experiences ⟨s, a, r, s ′, a1, . . . , aM ⟩ from D .
16: Sample action a j_ from Qϕ j_ with a
j
i_ ← a ji for each type i .
17: Set y j = r j + γvMTMF
ϕ j_
(s ′) according to Eq. 21.
18: Update the Q network by minimizing the loss L(ϕ j ) = 1k
∑(y j −
Qϕ j (s j , a j , a j1, . . . , a jM ))2
19: end while
20: Update the parameters of the target network for each agent j with learning
rate τ ; ϕ j_ ← τϕ j + (1 − τ )ϕ j_
21: end while
(a) Game Domain Multi Battle (b) Multi Battle Training
(c) Win % for each algorithm (d) Total rewards taken as an average
per episode
Figure 1: Multi Battle Game Results.
groups are fully known upfront. In the third game, the conditions
are such that the types of the agents are initially unknown. Hence,
the agents must also learn the identity of the opponent agents dur-
ing game play. Multi Team Battle and Gathering are two separately
existing MAgent games, which have been combined to obtain the
Battle-Gathering game used in this paper. Predator Prey domain is
Algorithm 2 Multi Type Mean Field Q Learning for unknown
types
1: Initialize the number of types M and total number of agents N .
2: Initialize the Q functions (parameterised by weights) Qϕ j , Qϕ j_ , for all agents j .
3: Initialize the mean action for each type a j1 , a
j
2 . . . a
j
M for each agent j ∈
1, . . . , N
4: Initialize the total number of steps (T) and total number of episodes (E)
5: Initialize every agent to a type at random. Initialize an array A containing the
previous action of all agents.
6: Maintain a buffer B for storing the lastC actions of all agents.C is determined by
the conditions of the environment. Initialize all values to 0.
7: while Episode < E do
8: while steps < T do
9: whilem = 1 . . .M do
10: For each agent j take action a j from Qϕ j according to Eq. 23 with the
current mean action for each type a j1, . . . , a
j
M and the exploration rate
β .
11: For each agent j, compute the new mean action for each type
a j1, . . . , a
j
M according to Eq. 22.
12: end while
13: Execute the joint action a = [a1, . . . , aN ]. Observe the rewards r =
[r 1, . . . , rN ] and the next state s ′.
14: Store ⟨s, a, r, s ′, a1, . . . , aM ⟩ in replay buffer D , where ai is the mean
action for type i in the neighbourhood. The a captures all the N agents.
15: Store each action [a1, . . . , aN ] in the Array A. Update the Buffer B with
the last action taken by all agents.
16: Perform a K means clustering on B with the number of clusters equal to
the number of types M .
17: Reassign the agents to different types based on the cluster in K means.
18: end while
19: while j = 1 to N do
20: Sample a minibatch of K experiences ⟨s, a, r, s ′, a1, . . . , aM ⟩ from D .
21: Sample action a j_ from Qϕ j_ with a
j
i_ ← a ji for each type i .
22: Set y j = r j + γvMTMF
ϕ j_
(s ′) according to Eq. 21.
23: Update the Q network by minimizing the loss L(ϕ j ) = 1k
∑(y j −
Qϕ j (s j , a j , a j1, . . . , a jM ))2
24: end while
25: Update the parameters of the target network for each agent j with learning
rate τ ; ϕ j_ ← τϕ j + (1 − τ )ϕ j_
26: end while
(a) Game Domain Battle Gathering (b) Battle Gathering training
(c) Win % for each algorithm (d) Total Rewards taken as an average
per episode.
Figure 2: Battle-Gathering Game Results.
(a) Game Domain Predator Prey (b) Predator Prey Training
(c) Win % for each algorithm (d) Total rewards taken as an average
per episode
Figure 3: Predator Prey Game Results.
also obtained from combining Multi Team Battle with another ex-
isting MAgent game (Pursuit). In preparation for each game, agents
train for 2000 episodes of game play against different groups train-
ing using the same algorithm, which is referred to as the first stage.
Next, in the second stage, they enter into a faceoff against other
agents trained by other algorithms where they fight each other for
1000 games. We report the results for both stages. We repeat all
experiments 50 times and report the averages. As can be seen from
the nature of the experiments, variances can be quite large across
individual experimental runs.
In the first game (Multi Team Battle, see Figure 1(a)), there are
four teams (different colors in Figure 1(a)) fighting against each
other to win a battle. Here, agents belonging to one team are com-
peting against agents from other teams and cooperating with agents
of the same team. During the first stage, a team does not know how
the other teams will play during the faceoff — so it clones itself to
three additional teams with slightly different rewards in order to
induce different strategies. This is similar to self play. Each team
receives a reward equal to the sum of the local rewards attributed
to each agent in the team. The reward function is defined in such a
way that it encourages local cooperation in killing opponents and
discourages getting attacked and dying in the game. The reward
function for different agent groups are also subtly different (refer
to Appendix B for the details). Let us call each of these Groups:
Group A, Group B, Group C, and Group D. We maintain a notion
of favourable opponents and each Group gets slightly higher re-
wards for killing the favourable opponents than the others. Four
algorithms, namely MFQ [17], MFAC [17], Independent Q Learning
(IL) [16], and MTMFQ are trained separately where each of these
groups trains its own separate network using the same algorithm.
We start all the battles with 72 agents of each group for training
and testing. Group A from MTMFQ, Group B from IL, Group C
from MFQ, and Group D from MFAC enter the faceoff stage where
they fight each other for 1000 games. Each game (or episode) has a
maximum of 500 steps and a game is considered to be won by the
group/groups that have the most number of agents alive at the end
of the game.
The results of the first training stage are reported in Figure 1(a).
We report the cumulative rewards from all agents in Group A for
each algorithm. These rewards are for Group A against the other
3 groups. Since the different groups are just clones of each other
the reward curves for other groups are similar to that of Group A.
In the training stage, the teams trained by different algorithms did
not play against each other, but simply against the cloned teams
trained by the same algorithm. At the beginning of training, for
about 100 episodes the agents are still exploring and their strategies
are not well differentiated yet. As a result, MTMFQ’s performance
is still comparable to the performance of other algorithms. At this
stage, the assumption of a single type is fine. As training progresses,
each group begins to identify the favorable opponents and tries to
make a targeted approach in the battle. When such differences exist
across a wide range of agents, the MTMFQ algorithm shows a better
performance than the other techniques as it explicitly considers the
presence of different types in the game. Overall, we observe that
MTMFQ has a faster convergence than all other algorithms and it
also produces higher rewards at the end of the complete training.
This shows that MTMFQ identifies favorable opponents early, but
the other algorithms struggle longer to learn this condition. The
MFAC algorithm is the worst overall. This is consistent with the
observation by Yang et al. [17], where the authors give particular
reasons for this bad performance, including the Greedy in the limit
with infinite exploration (GLIE) assumption and a positive bias of
Q learning algorithms. This algorithm is not able to earn an overall
positive reward upon the complete training. Figure 1(c) shows
the win rate of the teams trained by each algorithm (MTMFQ,
MFQ, MFAC, and IL) in a direct faceoff of 1000 episodes. In the
face off, each group is trained by a different algorithm and with a
different reward function that induces different strategies. The only
algorithm that handles different strategies among the opponent
teams is MTMFQ and therefore it dominates the other algorithms
with a win rate of 60%. Figure 1(d) reinforces this domination.
The second domain is the Battle-Gathering game (Figure 2(a)). In
this game, all the agent groups compete for food resources that are
limited (red denotes food particles and other colours are competing
agents) in addition to killing its opponents as in the Multi Team
Battle game. Hence, this game is harder than the first one. All the
training and competition are similar to the first game.
Figure 2(b) reports the results of training in the Battle-Gathering
game. Like the Multi Battle Game, we plot the rewards obtained
by Group A while fighting other groups for each algorithm. Again,
MTMFQ shows the strongest performance in comparison to the
other three algorithms. The MFQ technique performs better than
both MFAC and IL. In this game, MTMFQ converges in around 1500
episodes, while the other algorithms take around 1800 episodes to
converge. The win rates shown in Figure 2(c) and the total rewards
reported in Figure 2(d) also show the dominance of MTMFQ.
The third domain is the multiagent Predator Prey (Figure 3(a)).
Here we have two distinct types of agents — predator and prey, each
having completely different characteristics. The prey are faster than
the predators and their ultimate goal is to escape the predators. The
predators are slower than the prey, but they have higher attacking
abilities than the prey. So the predators try to attack more and kill
more prey. Wemodel this game as an unknown type scenario where
the types of the other agents in the competition are not known
before hand (refer to Appendix B for more details). The MTMFQ
algorithm plays the version with unknown types (Algorithm 2).
Here we have four groups with the first two groups (Groups A and
B) being predators and the other two groups (Groups C and D) being
prey. Each algorithm will train two kinds of predator agents and
two kinds of prey agents. All these agents are used in the playoff
stage. In the playoff stage we have 800 games where we change the
algorithm of predator and prey at every 200 games to maintain a
fair competition. For the first 200 games, MTMFQ plays Group A,
MFQ plays Group B, IL plays Group C, and MFAC plays Group D.
In the next 200 games, MFAC plays Group A, MTMFQ plays Group
B, MFQ plays Group C and IL plays Group D, and so on. We start
all training and testing episodes with 90 prey and 45 predators for
each group. Winning a game in the playoff stage is defined in the
same way as the previous two games. Notice that this makes it more
fair, as predators have to kill a lot more prey to win the game (as
we start with more prey than predators) and prey have to survive
longer. In this setup, the highly different types of agents make type
identification easier forMTMFQ (as the types are initially unknown).
The prey execute more move actions while the predators execute
more attack actions. This can be well differentiated by clustering.
The results of the first training stage are reported in Figure 2(b).
MTMFQ has comparable or even weaker performance than other
algorithms in the first 600 episodes of the training and the reason-
ing is similar to the reasoning in the Multi Battle game (the agent
strategies are not sufficiently differentiated for multiple types to
be useful). Notice that for this game, MTMFQ takes many more
episodes than the earlier two games to start dominating. This is
because of the inherent hardness of this domain compared to the
other domains (very different and unknown types). Similar to ob-
servations in the other domains, MTMFQ converges earlier (after
around 1300 episodes as opposed to 1700 for the other algorithms).
This shows its robustness to the different kinds of opponents in the
environment. MTMFQ also gains higher cumulative rewards than
the other algorithms. Win rates in Figure 3(c) show that MTMFQ
still wins more games than the other algorithms, but the overall
number of games won is less than the other domains. Thus, irrespec-
tive of the difficulty of the challenge we can see that MTMFQ has
an upper hand. The lead of MTMFQ is also observed in Figure 3(d).
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we extended the notion of mean field theory to mul-
tiple types in MARL. We demonstrate that reducing many agent
interactions to simple two agent interactions does not give very
accurate solutions in environments where there are clearly different
teams/types playing different strategies. We perform suitable ex-
periments using MAgents and demonstrate superior performances
using a type based approach. We hope that this paper will provide a
different dimension to the mean field theory based MARL research.
One limitation of our approach is that it is computationally more
expensive than the Mean Field Method without types. If we really
have only one type in the environment, then our method would
add more compute time and not necessarily produce a better result.
As future work we would like to extend this work for completely
heterogeneous agents with different action spaces as well. StarCraft
is one example of such a domain. Our work would be well suited for
this scenario as clustering would be even easier. Another approach
would be to consider sub types, further dividing types.
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APPENDIX A: ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
This section provides an example of a simulated scenario where the
Multi Type Mean Field algorithm is more useful than the simple
mean field algorithm.
Consider a game in which the central agent has to decide the
direction of spin. The domain is stateless. The spin direction is
influenced by the direction of spin of its A,B,C and D neighbours
(four neighbours in total). Here we denote A as the neighbour to
the left of Agent, B as the neighbour to the top of the agent, C as
the neighbour to the right of the agent and D as the neighbour to
the bottom of the agent. The neighbour agents spin in one direction
at random. If the agent spins in the same direction as both of its C
and D neighbours, the agent gets a reward of -2 regardless of what
the A and B are doing. If the spin is in the same direction as both
of its A and B neighbours, the agent gets a +2 reward unless the
direction is not the same as the one used by both of its C and D
neighbours. All other scenarios result in a reward of 0. So the agent
in Grid A in Figure 4 will get a -2 for the spin down (since the C
and D neighbours are spinning down) and a +2 for a spin up (since
the A and B neighbours are spinning up). In Grid B of Figure 4 the
agent will get a -2 for spin up and a +2 for spin down. It is clear
that the best action in Grid A is to spin up and the best action in
Grid B is to spin down.
Here we have a notion of multi stage game with many individual
stages. In each stage of a multi stage game, one or more players
take one action each, simultaneously and obtain rewards.
Consider a sequence of stage games in which the agent gets Grid
A for every 2 consecutive stages and then the Grid B for the third
stage. The goal of the agent is to take the best possible action at
all stages. Let us assume that the agent continues to learn at all
stages and it starts with Q values of 0. We apply MFQ (Equation 2)
and MTMFQ (Equation 20) and show why MFQ fails, but MTMFQ
succeeds in this situation. We are going to calculate the Q values
for the 3 stages using both the MFQ (from [17]) and the MTMFQ
update rules. We approximate the average action using the number
of times the neighbourhood agents spin up. In the MTMFQ we use
the A, B neighbours as the type 1 and the C, D neighbours as the
type 2.
Applying MFQ:
In the first stage,
Q
j
1(↑,aj = 2) = 0 + 0.1(2 − 0) = 0.2
Q
j
1(↓,aj = 2) = 0 + 0.1(−2 − 0) = −0.2
Thus, the agent will chose to spin up in the first stage (correct
action).
For the second stage,
Q
j
2(↑,aj = 2) = 0.38
Q
j
2(↓,aj = 2) = −0.38
Again the agent will chose to spin up in the second stage (correct
action).
For the third stage,
Q
j
3(↑,aj = 2) = 0.38 + 0.1(−2 − 0.38) = 0.142
(a) Grid A (b) Grid B
Figure 4: A counter example to show the failure of MFQ and
success of MTMFQ.
Q
j
3(↓,aj = 2) = −0.38 + 0.1(2 + 0.38) = −0.142
Here again the agent will chose to make the spin up (wrong
action).
Now coming to MTMFQ updates, for the first stage,
Q
j
1(↑,a
j
1 = 2,a
j
2 = 0) = 0 + 0.1(2 − 0) = 0.2
Q
j
1(↓,a
j
1 = 2,a
j
2 = 0) = 0 + 0.1(−2 − 0) = −0.2
Here the agent will spin up (correct action).
For the second stage,
Q
j
2(↑,a
j
1 = 2,a
j
2 = 0) = 0.38
Q
j
2(↓,a
j
1 = 2,a
j
2 = 0) = −0.38
Again the agent will spin up (correct action).
For the third stage,
Q
j
3(↑,a
j
1 = 0,a
j
2 = 2) = −0.2
Q
j
3(↓,a
j
1 = 0,a
j
2 = 2) = 0.2
Now it can be seen that the agent will spin down in this case
(correct action).
Thus the MFQ agent will make one wrong move out of 3 moves
whereas the MTMFQ agent will make the right move all the time.
In situations like these, where the relationship of the agent with
different neighbour agents is different, the MFQ algorithm would
fail. The differences would be captured by MTMFQ which would
take more efficient actions. This shows an example where MTMFQ
outperforms MFQ.
APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
This section gives more details about the experimental conditions,
especially the reward function.
For the Multi Team Battle domain, the agents in all of these
groups get a reward of -0.01 for each move action, and a reward of
-1 for dying. Attacking an empty grid has a reward of -0.1. Each of
these members has a power of 10 and a damage of 2. When an agent
loses all its powers, it dies. The power is like health that the agents
maintain which gets depleted on being attacked. The agents can also
recover (regain health points) from the attack using a step recovery
rate. This is set to be 0.1. The positive rewards for attacking another
agent is cyclic in nature with each group preferring to attack and
kill a particular opponent group more than others. Group A has a
positive reward of 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4 for attacking an agent of group
B, C and D respectively and it gets a reward of 80, 90, and 100 for
killing a member of group B, C, and D respectively. Here we will
call Group D as the favorable opponent of Group A as A gets more
returns for fighting or killing D. The group B has a positive reward
of 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4 for attacking a member of group C, D, and A
respectively and a positive reward of 80, 90, and 100 for killing a
member of Group C, D, and A respectively. Thus, Group A is the
favorable opponent of Group B. Group C has a reward of 0.2, 0.3,
and 0.4 for attacking Groups D, A, and B respectively. It gets a kill
reward of 80, 90, and 100 for killing agents of Group D, A and B
respectively. For Group D the order is Group A, B and C with a
attack reward of 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4 and kill reward of 80, 90, and 100.
For the Battle-Gathering game, the reward function is similar
with an addition of each agent getting a +80 for collecting a food
resource. The food resources are stationary objects but each food
resource has a power similar to agents. This power has to be reduced
by damage before the food can be captured. Capturing a food will
constitute making repeated efforts to gain the food resource by
attacking the grid containing food. The agents would get a +0.5 for
making such an attack.
For the Predator Prey domain, the predators have a power of 10
and a speed of 2 with an attack range of 2 (they can attack within a
distance of 2 units) and they get a dead penalty of -0.1 and an attack
penalty of -0.2. The step recovery rate is 0.1. The prey have a faster
speed of 2.5 and an attack range of 0. All agents get a reward of +5
for killing agents belonging to other groups. Additionally, Group
A gets a reward of +0.5 for attacking a member of Group B (since
Group B is also a predator, Group A does not prefer to attack that),
+1 for attacking a member of Group C, +3 for attacking a member
of Group D (though both Groups C and D are prey, A prefers D to
C). Group B gets 0.5 for attacking A, but gets +1 for attacking D
and +3 for attacking C. Group B prefers Group C to Group D. Every
attack action entails a punishment for the (attack) receiver which
is equal in value to the reward for the attacker.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF LEMMA 2 USED IN
THIS PAPER
This section explains the changed Lemma used in this paper com-
pared to Theorem 1 in [8].
We state and prove a general theorem for a stochastic process
before we begin the proof.
Theorem 6.1. If we have a stochastic process of the form
yn+1 − pyn = d (42)
where n goes from 0 to ∞, then the general solution of this process
can be given by
if p = 1 :
yn = dn + a;
if p , 1 :
yn =
d
1−p + (a − d1−p )pn
(43)
where y0 = a
Proof.
yn+1 − pyn = d (44)
Z transforms will be applied to solve this expression. Z transform
is a generalized version of Discrete Time Fourier Transform that
transforms the variables into a new subspace where solving the
equation is easier. Once we obtain a solution, we can apply inverse
Z transforms to get the solution in terms of the original variables.
zY (z) − zy0 − pY (z) = dzz−1
(z − p)Y (z) = dzz−1 + za
Y (z) = dz(z−1)(z−p) + azz−p
(45)
Considering p , 1 we can rewrite the Equation 45 as
Y (z) = dz[ 1(1−p)(z−1) − 1(1−p)(z−p) ] + azz−p
Y (z) = d1−p 11−z−1 − d1−p 11−pz−1 + a1−pz−1
Y (z) = d1−p 11−z−1 + (a − d1−p )( 11−pz−1 )
(46)
Now taking the inverse Z transform
yn = [ d1−p + (a − d(1−p) )pn ] (47)
The above result is for the case where p , 1. If p = 1, see that the
Equation 42 forms an arithmetic progression whose general term
is a + nd .
□
Now from Theorem 6.1, notice that if we want a general stochas-
tic process of that form to converge we need the coefficient p to be
a fraction (as we take a limit to∞ in the solution only a p which is
a fraction will give a converged result). Note that this result only
needs d to be finite and it can be any finite number. If we iterate
to infinity then we can apply the limit to the solution which will
converge to yn = d1−p .
Lemma 3. A Random process
wn+1(x) = (1 − αn (x))wn (x) + βn (x)rn (x) (48)
converges to zero w.p.1, if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) ∑n αn (x) = ∞,∑n α2n (x) < ∞,∑
n βn (x) = ∞ and
∑
n β
2
n (x) < ∞
uniformly over x w.p.1
2) E{rn (x)|Pn , βn } = 0
and E{r2n (x)|Pn , βn } ≤ C
w.p.1,where
Pn = {wn ,wn−1, . . . , rn−1, rn−1, . . . ,
αn−1,αn−2, . . . , βn−1, βn−2, . . .}
(49)
All the random variables are allowed to depend on the past Pn .
αn (x) and βn (x) are assumed to be non-negative and mutually inde-
pendent given Pn .
Proof. This is same as Lemma 1 in [8]. The proof is based on that
fact that we can divide the processwn+1 (both sides of Equation 48)
by a large valueW (x) such that rn (x) ≪W (x). Now the Equation
48 is effectively reduced to
wn+1(x) = (1 − αn (x))wn (x) (50)
This is because of the conditions 1 and 2 which guarantees that βn
is a fraction and that the variance of the process rn is finite.
Now if you consider Equation 50, the update is in such a way
that the process is equal to a fraction of its previous value. Thus,
this process converges to 0 w.p.1.
□
Lemma 4. Consider the stochastic iteration
Xn+1(x) = Gn (Xn ,Yn ,x) (51)
where Gn is a sequence of functions and Yn is a random process. Let
(Ω,F ,P) be a probability space. If the following are satisfied:
1) The process is scale invariant. That is w.p.1 for all ω ∈ Ω
G(βXn ,Yn (ω),x) = βG(Xn ,Yn (ω),x) (52)
2) If we can keep | |Xn | | bounded by scaling the process then Xn
would converge to a constant D w.p.1 under condition 1.
The original process will converge to a constant D1 = Dβ0 where β0
is the scaling factor that was applied to | |Xn | |.
Proof. The intuition of the proof is that we have a process that
starts at a value and its first difference reduces with time till the
value stabilizes at a point. Now, if this process is invariant to scaling,
we can start the process with a small value (after scaling by a small
fraction β0) and then we can select a constant over which the | |Xn | |
should not increase (we can scale the whole process if it goes above
that constant). Now according to the second condition the bounded
process should converge to a constantD. Here the relation isD ≤ C .
To show that the net effect of the corrections must stay finite w.p.1,
note that if | |Xn | | converges then for any ϵ > 0 there exists Mϵ
such that | |Xn | | ≤ D ≤ C for all n > Mϵ with probability at least
1−ϵ . This implies that the norm of the original process does not go
aboveC afterMϵ . Thus, convergence of | |Xn | | to constant D would
then imply that the scaled version of the original process converges
to the same constant D w.p.1 under the bound. Now if we remove
the scaling factor the convergence point of the original process is
D
β0
. □
Lemma 5. A stochastic processXn which is bounded by the relation
|Xn+1(x)| = (1 − α)|Xn (x)| + γ βC1 + K (53)
converges to a constant D w.p.1 provided
1) x ∈ S , where S is a finite set.
2)
∑
n α = ∞,
∑
n α
2 < ∞, ∑n β = ∞, ∑n β2 < ∞,
E{β |Pn } ≤ E{α |Pn }, uniformly over x with probability one
where
Pn = {wn ,wn−1, . . . , rn−1, rn−1, . . . ,α , β}
and α , β and γ are assumed to be non negative.
3) K is finite.
4) γ ∈ (0, 1)
5) The original process Xn is scale invariant.
The convergence point of the original process will be then D =
K+γ βC1
α β0
where β0 is the scaling factor applied to the original process.
Proof. This is simply an application of Lemma 4.
According to condition 5, we have a process that is scale invariant.
Let us assume that we applied a scaling factor of β0 to that process
to get the bound as in Equation 53. Now, let us consider the iterative
process
|Xn+1(x)| = (1 − α)|Xn (x)| + γ βC1 + K (54)
Equation 54 is linear in |Xn (x)| and will converge to a point by
Theorem 6.1 w.p.1, to some X ∗(x), where | |X ∗ | | ≤ E1, where E1
is a finite arbitrary constant. From Theorem 6.1 we can see that
Equation 54 converges to a constant and hence, Lemma 4 can be
applied. The convergence point will be K+γ βC1α from Theorem 6.1
for Equation 54. If we change the value of the bound C1 then the
convergence point will change accordingly. To get the convergence
point of the original process, we reapply the scaling factor. Thus
we get that point to be K+γ βC1α β0 .
□
Theorem 6.2. A random iterative process
∆n+1(x) = (1 − α)∆n (x) + βFn (x)
converges to a constant D w.p.1 under the following conditions:
1) x ∈ S , where S is a finite set.
2)
∑
n α = ∞,
∑
n α
2 < ∞, and∑
n β = ∞,
∑
n β
2 < ∞, and
E{β |Pn } ≤ E{α |Pn }, uniformly over x w.p.1
3) | | E{Fn (x)|Pn , β}| |w ≤ γ | |∆n | |w +K , where γ ∈ (0, 1) and K is
finite.
4)Var {Fn (x)|Pn , β} ≤ C(1+ | |∆n | |W )2, where C is some constant.
Here
Pn = {Xn ,Xn−1, . . . , Fn−1, . . . ,α , β}
stands for the past at step n. Fn (x) is allowed to depend on the past.
α and β are assumed to be non negative. The notation | |.| | refers to
some weighted maximum norm.
The value of this constant D = ψC1+β |K |α β0 whereψ ∈ (0, 1) and C1
is the constant with which the iterative process is bounded. β0 is the
scaling factor that was applied to the original process.
Proof. Be defining rn (x) = Fn (x) − E{Fn (x)|Pn , β} we can de-
compose the iterative process into two parallel processes given
by
δn+1(x) = (1 − α)δn (x) + β E{Fn (x)|Pn , β}
wn+1(x) = (1 − α)wn (x) + βrn (x) (55)
where∆n (x) = δn (x)+wn (x). Dividing both the sides of Equation 55
by β0 for each x and denoting δ ′n (x) = δn (x)/β0,w ′n (x) = wn (x)/β0
and r ′n (x) = rn (x)/β0 we can bound the δ ′n process by condition 3.
Now we can rewrite the equation pair from condition 3 as
|δ ′n+1 | ≤ (1 − α)|δ ′n (x)| + γ β | | |δ ′ | +w ′n | | + β |K |
w ′n+1(x) = (1 − α)w ′n (x) + γ βr ′n (x)
(56)
Let us assume that the ∆n process stays bounded. Then the
variance of r ′n (x) is bounded by some constant C and therebyw ′n
converges to zero w.p.1 according to Lemma 3. Hence, there exists
M such that for all n > m, | |w ′n | | < ϵ with probability at least 1 − ϵ .
This implies that the δ ′n process can be further bounded by
|δ ′n+1 | ≤ (1 − α)|δ ′n (x)| + γ β | |δ ′n − ϵ | | + β |K | (57)
with probability > 1 − ϵ . If we choose C such that γ (C + 1)/C ≤ 1
then for | |δ ′n | | > Cϵ
γ | |δ ′n + ϵ | | ≤ γ (C + 1)/C | |δ ′n | | (58)
Note that in the above relation we do not need the term C+1C
to be less than 1. We only need the product of this term with γ to
be less that one. Let us represent F = (C + 1)/C . Now rewriting
Equation 57 we get the following bound
|δ ′n+1 | ≤ (1 − α)|δ ′n (x)| + γ βF | |δ ′n | | + β |K | (59)
Let us bound the norm by C1. Then we get the bound as
|δ ′n+1 | ≤ (1 − α)|δ ′n (x)| + γ βFC1 + β |K | (60)
Let us assume that δn is scale invariant (we prove that below).
Now we can apply Lemma 5 as this satisfies all the conditions of
Lemma 5. The original process converges to a constant D w.p.1.
Again according to Lemma 5 this constant value isD = γ βFC1+β |K |α β0
where β0 is the factor with which the original process was scaled.
Let us denote a new fraction ψ = γ βF . Thus the value of D =
ψC1+β |K |
α β0
. Now, this guarantees w.p.1 convergence of the original
process under the boundedness assumption if that process is scale
invariant. Let the constant D1 = γ βFC1+β |K |α be the point Equation
60 converges to according to Theorem 6.1. Since, the value of D1
is very small for a small K (we will show that K is small in the
application) and a small C1 (since C1 is arbitrary, we can choose a
small C1), we can get |δn | ≈ δn .
Now we prove the scale invariance condition same as Jaakola et
al. [8]. By condition 4, r ′n (x) can be written as (1+ | |δn +wn | |)sn (x),
where E{s2n (x)|Pn } ≤ C . Let us now decomposewn as un +vn with
un+1(x) = (1 − α)un (x) + γ β | |δ ′n + un +vn | |sn (x)
vn+1(x) = (1 − α)vn (x) + γ βsn (x) (61)
and vn converges to zero w.p.1 by Lemma 3. Again by choosing C
such that γ (C + 1)/C < 1 we can bound the δ ′n and un processes for
| |δ ′n + un | | > Cϵ . The pair (δ ′n ,un ) is then a scale invariant process
whose bounded version was proven earlier to converge to D w.p.1.
This proves the w.p.1 convergence of the triple δ ′n ,un ,vn bounding
the original process.
□
